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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS - EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - TITLE VII -
PRIMA FACIE VIOLATION - The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that a non-discriminatory "bottom line" is no de-
fense to a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
The respondents, Winnie Teal, Rose Walker, Edith Latney and
Grace Clark, were black employees of the Department of Income
Maintenance of the State of Connecticut.' All four were provision-
ally promoted to Welfare Eligibility Supervisory positions and
served in such capacities for almost two years.2 In order to be con-
sidered for permanent supervisory positions, the respondents were
required to pass a written examination. On December 2, 1978, the
written test was given to 329 candidates." Based on a passing score
of 65%," only 54.17% of the identified black candidates passed the
exam, or approximately 68% of the corresponding passing rate for
white candidates.5 Respondents failed the examination and were
therefore excluded from further consideration for permanent su-
pervisory status. In April of 1979, respondents" filed suit in the
1. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Id. There were 48 black candidates and 259 white candidates.
4. Id. Although the actual mean score was 70.4%, the mean scores of the black candi-
dates were 6.7% lower than the scores of the white candidates; in an apparent attempt to
soften the disparate impact of the test, the passing rate was set at 65%. Id. n.3. See Teal v.
Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 135 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1981).
5. 102 S. Ct. at 2529. See id. n.4 for a detailed table illustrating the passing rates of
the various candidate groups who took the exam. The State of Connecticut did not contest
the district court's implicit finding that the exam on its face may have resulted in disparate
impact under the "eighty percent rule" of the Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection
Procedures adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See App. to Pet.
for Cert. 18a, 23a & n.2. The guidelines provide in relevant part that "[a] selection rate for
any race ... which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or 80%) of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1981).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 2529. These black respondents were joined on a pendent claim by four
white employees who alleged that the written test violated Connecticut law which required
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United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against
the State of Connecticut, two state agencies and two state officials,
alleging, inter alia, that the petitioners violated Title VIP by re-
quiring as an absolute condition for promotion consideration that
applicants pass a written, non-job-related, examination which dis-
proportionately excluded blacks.$
Approximately one month before trial, the petitioners made pro-
motions from the eligibility list generated by the written exam.9
Eleven blacks and thirty five whites were promoted to permanent
supervisory positions.10 The selection process resulted in the pro-
motion of 22.9% of the participating black candidates, while
13.5% of the white candidates were promoted.1 Petitioners urged
that this "bottom line" result, which was more favorable to blacks
than to whites, constituted a complete defense to the respondents'
law suit.12
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
treated respondents' claim as one of disparate impact' s and en-
tered judgment for the petitioners." Although Judge Daly recog-
nized that the comparative passing rates for the examination indi-
cated a prima facie case of adverse impact upon minorities, he
stated that the entire hiring process did not reflect such an adverse
impact. Accordingly, the district court held that the "bottom line"
percentages precluded the finding of a Title VII violation; there-
fore, the employer was not required to prove the examination's
job-relatedness. 5
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
that promotional exams be job-related. This claim was not addressed by the Court. See 645
F.2d 133, 135 n.3.
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 2529.
9. Id. Petitioners primarily considered past work performance, recommendations and
seniority, and then applied what the Second Circuit characterized as an affirmative action
program to ensure a significant number of minority supervisors. Although the petitioners
contested this characterization, the Supreme Court did not address the issue. Id. at 2530
n.5.
10. Id. at 2530.
11. Id. In actuality, the black candidates experienced a promotion rate 170% of the
promotion rate of the white candidates. Id. n.6.
12. Id. at 2530.
13. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (see infra notes 33, 36 and
accompanying text); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (see infra notes 34,
36 and accompanying text); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. 102 S. Ct. at 2530. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2530. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-24a, 26a.
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Circuit reversed' s and held that the district court erroneously de-
termined that the results of the written examination alone were
insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate impact under
Title VII. 17 Judge Meskill stated that any pass-fail barrier that de-
nied employment opportunities to a disproportionately large num-
ber of minorities and prevented them from advancing in the selec-
tion process must be shown to be job-related.18 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari ' and subsequently affirmed the
judgment of the Second Circuit, by holding that a nondiscrimina-
tory "bottom line" did not constitute a defense to the respondents'
prima facie claim of employment discrimination under Title VII.
20
Justice Brennan, author of the majority opinion,21 first ad-
dressed the issue of whether an examination that barred a dispa-
rate number of black employees from promotion consideration and
was not shown to be job-related presented a claim under section
703(a)(2) of Title VII.22 The respondents based their claim upon
the Court's prior construction of section 703(a)(2) in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.23 Justice Brennan noted that, although the em-
ployment requirements in Griggs applied equally to all employees
and applicants, a disproportionate number of blacks were barred
from employment opportunities. 4 The Griggs Court held that even
though there was no showing of racial purpose or invidious intent
by the employer in imposing these requirements, they were never-
16. Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981).
17. Id. at 137.
18. Id. at 138.
19. 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981).
20. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 (1982).
21. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens. Id. at 2526. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 2536 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 2530. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, prior to the enactment of Title VII, black employ-
ees of the company were restricted to the labor department. After the passage of Title VII,
employees who desired a transfer out of the labor department were required to have either a
high school diploma or to achieve a passing grade on two professionally-prepared aptitude
tests. Id. at 426-27. New employees were required to possess both the diploma and the pass-
ing grades to obtain employment outside the labor department. Id. at 427-28.
24. Id. at 426.
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theless invalid because of their disparate impact and lack of job-
relatedness.
Justice Brennan identified a three-prong analysis of disparate
impact claims as established through Griggs and its progeny.26 The
plaintiff must first show that the facially neutral employment prac-
tice had a significant discriminatory impact. If this is accom-
plished, the employer must then show that the requirement is job-
related in order to negate a finding of discrimination. However, the
plaintiff may still prevail if it is shown that the requirement was
used as mere pretext for discrimination.27 Justice Brennan ex-
plained that Griggs identified the congressional intent underlying
the enactment of Title VII, which was to remove "artificial, arbi-
trary and unnecessary barriers to employment" which had histori-
cally been encountered by women and blacks.2 "
Justice Brennan stated that the examination given by the peti-
tioners clearly fell within the language of section 703(A)(2) as in-
terpreted by Griggs.2s The language of section 703(a)(2) deals not
with jobs or promotions but rather with classifications and limita-
tions that would deprive an individual of employment opportuni-
ties.30 In enacting section 703(a)(2) Congress' basic objective was to
achieve equal employment opportunities and remove barriers
which had favored white employees in the past. 1 The use of a non-
job-related barrier by an employer to deny any minority or woman
applicant employment or promotion, which had an adverse effect
on the applicant's employment opportunities, clearly violates sec-
25. Id. at 431. The Court stated that: "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimi-
nation but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touch-
stone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. (emphasis
added).
26. 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
27. Id. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975). See also infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 2531. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Additionally, both
the House and the Senate reports cited Griggs with approval in the 1972 amendments to
Title VII which extended the protection of the act to state and municipal employees. See S.
REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1971) ("Employment as viewed today is a. . . com-
plex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe
the problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs"). See
also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1971), and 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2137.
29. 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
30. Id. See supra note 23.




Justice Brennan noted that Griggs, which relied on section
703(a)(2), specifically focused on employment practices, procedures
or tests which acted as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups.33
He found that in the instant case, the examination given to the
respondents clearly constituted a practice which created a barrier
to employment opportunities and equality.34 He added that the
Court's conclusion that respondents' claims were encompassed by
section 703(a)(2) was further reinforced through the 1972 congres-
sional extension of the protection of Title VII to state and munici-
pal employees.
Justice Brennan recognized that post-Griggs decisions, which
have considered disparate impact claims under section 703(a)(2),
have consistently focused on employment and promotional re-
quirements which created a discriminatory bar to employment op-
portunities. Further, he noted that the Court has never interpreted
section 703(a)(2) to focus on the overall numbers of applicants ac-
tually hired or promoted.36
Justice Brennan disagreed with the district court's dismissal of
respondents' claim for failure to establish a prima facie case of em-
32. 102 S. Ct. at 2532. Section 703(a)(2) prohibits "artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment" which would "limit. . . or classify. . . applicants for employ-
ment. . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 2532. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32.
34. 102 S. Ct. at 2532. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)
(Congress' purpose was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barri-
ers to equality).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 2532. Although Congress did not explicitly consider the viability of
the defense offered by the State of Connecticut, the 1972 amendments to Title VII reflected
a congressional intent to extend to state and municipal employees the same equality of op-
portunity and elimination of discriminatory barriers that the Griggs interpretation of Title
VII had afforded to employees in the private sector. Id. See supra note 25.
36. 102 S. Ct. at 2532. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court found
that the minimum statutory height and weight requirements for correction counselors con-
stituted an arbitrary barrier to equal employment opportunities for women forbidden by
Title VII. Id. at 331-32. Although Dothard noted the bottom line impact of the requirement,
it focused on the disparate effect that the height and weight requirements had on the female
applicants. Id. at 329-30. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the case
was remanded to permit the employer to prove that the tests given were job related. The
Court did not suggest that an employer could avoid meeting this burden of proof by pro-
moting a sufficient number of black employees who passed the examination. Id. at 436. Ad-
ditionally, in New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court determined
that statistical evidence which indicated that employment practice denies members of one
race equal employment opportunities did in fact establish a prima facie violation of Title
VII. Id. at 584.
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ployment discrimination under section 703(a)(2).37 He found that
the measurement of disparate impact solely at the bottom line ig-
nored the Title VII individual guarantee of an opportunity to com-
pete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related crite-
ria.38 Therefore, respondents' rights under section 703(a)(2) were
violated unless the petitioners could demonstrate that the exami-
nation was related to the effective performance of a Welfare Eligi-
bility Supervisor. 9
The United States, in its amicus curiae brief,40 observed that re-
spondents' claim was within the affirmative commands of Title
VII, but supported the district court's judgment which relied upon
an employer's defense as provided in section 703(h).41 The United
States contended that the petitioners' examination was not used to
discriminate because the employer did not actually deny promo-
tion to a disproportionate number of blacks.'2 Justice Brennan
noted that under Griggs, the United States' reliance on section
703(h) was misplaced."' He reiterated that the legislative history of
section 703(h) indicated that Congress added this provision to clar-
ify the permissability of job-related tests despite their disparate
impact." But the use of non-job-related tests, which had a dispa-
rate impact and were used to classify or limit employees, discrimi-
nated against employees under Title VII; it was irrelevant whether
the tests were designed or intended to have such an effect or
whether the employer attempted to compensate for a discrimina-
37. 102 S. Ct. at 2533.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Government's brief was submitted by the Justice Department which
shares responsibility for federal enforcement of Title VII with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC declined to join in the brief. Id. at 2533 n.11.
41. Section 703(h) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administrations or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 2533.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2533-34. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-36. Justice Brennan, in support of this
interpretation, revealed that when section 703(h) was introduced to the Senate as an
amendment to Title VII, it "'did not alter the meaning of Title VII, but "merely clarifie[d]
its present intent and effect.'"" 102 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting American Tobacco v. Patterson,
102 S. Ct. 1534, 1539 (1982) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 12723 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey))).
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tory effect.45 Therefore, Justice Brennan held that respondents'
claim of disparate impact from the examination's pass-fail barrier
stated a prima facie case under section 703(a)(2) to which no "bot-
tom line" defense could be asserted under section 703(h).4e
Justice Brennan next considered the position of petitioners and
amici curiae that an exception should be developed, either in the
nature of an additional burden upon employees in establishing a
prima facie case, or an affirmative defense, where employers com-
pensate for a discriminatory barrier by hiring or promoting a suffi-
cient number of blacks to thereby reach a non-discriminatory "bot-
tom line. 4 7 Justice Brennan rejected this suggestion because it
required a redefinition of the protections guaranteed by Title
VII.48
Justice Brennan again relied upon the legislative history of the
entire statute and its principal focus on the protection of the indi-
vidual employee, not the minority group as a whole. 49 He observed
that the petitioners and amici curiae apparently confused unlawful
discrimination and discriminatory intent in their assertion of a
"bottom line" defense to a discrimination claim by an individual
employee.50 Justice Brennan conceded that a non-discriminatory
bottom line coupled with a good faith effort to achieve a non-dis-
criminatory workforce could assist an employer in rebutting the in-
ference of intentional discrimination." However, he noted that the
question of intent was not at issue. The question was, rather,
whether petitioners could justify discrimination against respon-
dents in light of favorable treatment of other members of respon-
dents' racial group.52  Under Title VII, a racially balanced
workforce does not constitute a defense to individual acts of dis-
crimination.53 Justice Brennan emphasized that Congress clearly
45. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 2534.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. See 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case). See
also 110 CONG. REc. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 2535.
51. Id. "Proof that [a) work force was racially balanced or that it contained a dispro-
portionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of
intent when that issue is yet to be decided." Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
580 (1978). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) (statistical
evidence is not irrefutable and depends on surrounding facts and circumstances).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 2535.
53. Id. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), in which the Court
stated: "It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an
1983
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did not intend to permit employer discrimination against individ-
ual employees merely because of favorable treatment of others in
the employee's group.5"'
Petitioners next contended that the Court should distinguish
facially discriminatory policies from policies, such as in the instant
case, that are facially neutral with a discriminatory impact.5 5 Jus-
tice Brennan refused to recognize such a distinction and stated
that it is the effect on the individual victim and not the facial na-
ture of the discriminatory policy which results in a Title VII
violation. 56
The Court concluded that a nondiscriminatory "bottom line"
was no defense to the respondents' prima facie claim of employ-
ment discrimination; thus, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed and the case
was remanded. 5
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell"8 asserted that although
the Court's past decisions had been sensitive to the critical distinc-
tion between cases proving Title VII violations through a showing
of disparate treatment or discriminatory intent and those cases
showing disparate impact, the majority blurred this distinction in
the case at bar.'9 Justice Powell conceded that although the lan-
guage of section 703(a)(2) suggested that discrimination occurs
only on an individual basis, 60 the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.'" and subsequent disparate impact cases had considered the
violation of section 703(a)(2) in terms of the adverse impact on the
equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members
of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work force." Id. at 579
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water &Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978)). The Manhart Court could not justify the unfairness to individual female em-
ployees that was allowed by employers asserting favorable treatment to the class of woman
employees as as whole, because the statute's focus on the individual was unambiguous. Id.
at 708 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam)). In Phil-
lips, the Court found that a rule which barred the employment of married women with
preschool age children violated Title VII even though women constituted 75 to 80 percent of
the positions which the plaintiff sought. 400 U.S. at 551.
55. 102 S. Ct. at 2535.
56. Id. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 (1977)
(affirmation of good faith held insufficient to dispel prima facie case of discrimination).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 2536.
58. See supra note 22.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. See supra note 21.
61. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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individually protected group.6 Justice Powell explained the
Court's distinction that disparate treatment cases focus on the
treatment of the individual, while disparate impact cases deal with
the protected group. 8 Additionally, disparate impact cases subse-
quent to Griggs have consistently considered the result of the em-
ployer's total selection process in reference to any adverse impact
on the protected group." Justice Powell concluded that if the case
at bar were correctly decided on the basis of precedent, a disparate
impact would clearly not have been found. He further stated that
the majority ignored reality in its finding that the selection process
had an unfavorable disparate impact on blacks."'
Justice Powell noted that the majority, disregarding the distinc-
tion developed by precedent, continuously asserted that Title VII
focused on individual, not group, rights." He stated that in so do-
ing, the aims of Title VII were confused with the legal theories
through which those aims were to be vindicated.67 Although indi-
viduals, not groups, are intended to be protected by Title VII, its
jurisprudence has recognized two distinct methods of proof: those
cases involving direct proof of discriminatory intent," in contrast
with disparate impact cases in which plaintiffs prove discrimina-
tion by inference." Justice Powell asserted that there can be no
62. In Griggs, the Court held that the disparate impact of an employer's practices on a
racial group may be violative of § 703(a)(2). See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978) in which Justice Marshall stated:
It is well established under Title VII that claims of employment discrimination be-
cause of race may arise in two different ways.. . An individual may allege that he
has been subjected to "disparate treatment" because of his race, or that he has been
the victim of a facially neutral practice having a "disparate" impact on his racial
group.
Id. at 581-82 (citation omitted).
64. 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977) (height and weight requirements found to disproportionately bar women's oppor-
tunity for employment as correction counselors); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 409-11 (1975) (seniority system and test requirement kept disproportionate amount of
blacks in lower paying jobs); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (require-
ment of high school diploma and passing grade on achievement test found to exclude dis-
proportionate number of blacks).
65. 102 S. Ct. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell concluded that the 22.9%
promotion rate for blacks when compared with the 13.5% rate for whites would clearly indi-
cate no disparate impact. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. In these cases, the main focus is on the individual plaintiff who, at the fore-
front throughout the presentation of evidence, tries to establish direct, intentional discrimi-
nation. Id.
69. Id. The plaintiff attempts to show that the selection process results in dispropor-
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Title VII violation based on the disparate impact theory absent
disparate impact on a group."
Justice Powell suggested that, in the instant case, respondents
conflated both theories by undertaking to prove discrimination by
reference to group figures while attempting to preclude a showing
of non-discrimination through viewing the impact on the group
and the process as a whole. 71 According to Justice Powell, the ma-
jority's acceptance of the respondents' position confused the indi-
vidualistic aim of Title VII with the methods of proof through
which Title VII rights are vindicated.7" Justice Powell admitted
that respondents as individuals were entitled to Title VII protec-
tion but stressed that after pleading a disparate impact claim, they
could not deny the petitioners the opportunity to introduce evi-
dence that no disparate impact existed.7" He stated that under a
facially neutral employment process, without adverse impact on
the group, Title VII was not violated.7 '
Justice Powell next addressed the distinction between the
facially discriminatory policy cases 75 and those facially neutral pol-
icy situations such as in the instant case," and concluded that this
distinction must not be blurred. Disparate impact claims such as
those found in Teal are based upon how well groups fare in rela-
tion to other groups under a particular practice or test.77 In fact,
where one individual minority member has taken a test, Justice
Powell noted that there can be no disparate impact claim regard-
less of what weight is given the test in the selection process.
7 1
tionate rejection of members of a protected group to which he belongs; thus, an inference
may be drawn that the plaintiff was himself a victim of this discriminatory process. Id.
70. Id. The EEOC has adopted bottom line principles in deciding whether to bring an
action against an employer. Id. at 2537 n.4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting). See EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188
(3d Cir. 1980), in which the Third Circuit observed: "[n]o violation of Title VII can be
grounded on the disparate impact theory without proof that the questioned policy or prac-
tice has had a disproportionate impact on the employer's workforce . . . there can be no
disparate impact unless there is disparate impact." Id. at 192.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971) (per curiam).
76. 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
77. Id. at 2539 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2539 n.7. Justice Powell noted that in disparate impact cases, the probative
value of statistical evidence varies with the sample size; a sample of only one for example,
would be too small to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. See, e.g., Interna-
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Justice Powell concluded that the majority's decision was a step
in the direction of confusion; that Title VII does not require imple-
mentation of merit hiring or measures directed at placing the
greatest number of minority applicants for consideration for posi-
tions or promotion;7 9 nor does it require that employers develop
tests which accurately reflect the skills of each individual candi-
date. He commented that the majority appeared to be unaware of
the practical reality and probable consequences of its decision.so
Justice Powell expressed his concern that the majority could force
employers to eliminate tests or rely upon expensive job-related test
procedures which might not sustain challenge.81 As a result of the
majority's decision, state and local governmental units with limited
funds could resort to quota hiring, an arbitrary and unfair employ-
ment method, which could result in the employment of fewer mi-
nority members.8 2
Disparate impact and disparate treatment cases83 have been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court as prima facie violations of Title
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 n.20 (1977) (small sample size
detracts from value of statistical evidence); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974) (sample size of thirteen presents concern); Rogillio v.
Diamond Shamrock Chem., 446 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Dendy v. Washington
Hosp. Center, 431 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D.D.C. 1977) (sample must mirror the employment
situation).
79. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59
(1981) (employer not required to give preferential treatment to minorities or women, nor
restructure the employment practice so as to maximize their number hired); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (employer not required to modify his employment
practices so as to enable the maximum number of minorities and women to be given em-
ployment opportunities).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2539 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2539-40 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell quoted from Brown v. New
Haven Civil Serv. Comm'n, 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D.Conn. 1979), in which the Connecticut
District Court warned:
[A]s private parties are permitted under Title VII itself to adopt voluntary affirma-
tive action plans ... Title VII should not be construed to prohibit a municipality's
using a hiring process that results in a percentage of minority policemen approximat-
ing their percentage of the local population, instead of relying on the expectations
that a validated job-related testing procedure will produce an equivalent result, yet
with the risk that it might lead to substantially less minority hiring.
Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).
83. Under disparate impact cases, facially neutral practices (no overt discriminatory
motive evident) that have discriminatory consequences are considered; while under dispa-
rate treatment cases the plaintiff must show discriminatory motive or intent by the em-
ployer to establish a violation. See, Furnish, A Path through the Maze: Disparate Impact
and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and
Burdine, 23 B.C.L.Rav. 419 (1982).
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.84 The disparate impact theory
finds its origin in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., s5 a 1971 decision in
which the Supreme Court held that Title VII attempts to eliminate
employment practices which create barriers and discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.86 The im-
port of the Griggs decision was the Court's finding that a showing
of intent to discriminate was not necessary to constitute a violation
of Title VII;87 rather, the Griggs Court concluded that even a
facially neutral policy or practice which disproportionately ex-
cluded members of a protected class would be found to be unlaw-
ful, unless the employer could show a business necessity for the
policy or practice.88
Decided five years after Griggs,89 Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody"0 provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clar-
ify the Griggs burden in disparate impact cases.9' As in Griggs, the
Albemarle plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing dis-
parate impact. The burden then shifted to the employer who was
required to show a business necessity for the particular policy or
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra note 23. In Griggs, after the passage of Title VII,
the company required existing employees to have either a high school diploma or achieve a
passing grade on an intelligence test in order to be promoted out of the labor department.
New applicants were further burdened by having to meet both requirements. While these
requirements were applied to all individuals equally, they had a disproportionate effect on
black candidates. 401 U.S. at 427-30.
86. Id. at 431.
87. The Griggs approach contrasted the traditional action under the equal protection
clause where intent is critical. See, e.g, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Davis
dealt with recruiting procedures for police officers which included passing a written person-
nel test that had a disproportionate effect on black candidates. The plaintiffs in Davis pro-
ceeded under the equal protection clause, asserting that their fifth amendment due process
rights were violated. (It should be noted that when this suit was filed, Title VII did not
extend to governmental employees). See Teal v. Connecticut, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 n.8
(1982). See also Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976). The Davis Court
found that the test, neutral on its face, did not constitute a violation, and that proof of
intent to discriminate is essential. 426 U.S. at 246-48. See generally, Friedman, The Burger
Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979).
88. 401 U.S. at 431.
89. In this interim period, the Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) which recognized the disparate treatment theory where the plaintiff asserts
intentional, but covert, discrimination. Id. at 801. In disparate treatment cases the question
of intent is crucial, see infra note 91, while in disparate impact cases such as Griggs, intent
is irrelevant. See Furnish, supra note 83, at 419.
90. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In Albemarle, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the com-
pany's use of a seniority system and pre-employment tests which were shown to have an
adverse impact on blacks. Id. at 409.
91. Id. at 436.
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practice in question." Albemarle further determined that even if a
particular practice was validated through a showing of business ne-
cessity, the plaintiff could rebut the employer's defense and prove
that it was a mere pretext for discrimination by exposing less dis-
criminatory alternatives." Albemarle not only explained the mean-
ing of the Griggs business necessity defense," but expanded its
burden of proof by creating the rebuttal by the plaintiff. In so do-
ing, the Court paralleled the orders of proof in disparate impact
cases with those of disparate treatment cases.
95
In Dothard v. Rawlinson," a non-test disparate impact case, the
class action plaintiffs alleged that an Alabama statute was sexually
discriminatory.9 7 Although the Supreme Court upheld the plain-
tiffs' use of statistical evidences8 to show that the requirements of
the statute excluded a disproportionate number of females from
employment as prison guards,"9 and recognized the district court's
appropriate application of Title VII,'00 the Court, without address-
ing the question of intent, nonetheless found Alabama's job-related
business necessity defense to be a bonafide occupational qualifica-
tion and therefore not a violation of Title VII.1V 0 In effect,
92. The Albernarle Court's explanation of business necessity required the employer to
prove that the tests were job-related, id. at 425, as defined under EEOC guidelines, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.1-.18 (1981). 422 U.S. at 430-31.
93. 422 U.S. at 436. It is interesting to note that the Court cited McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a disparate treatment case, in identifying this addi-
tional burden in the form of a rebuttal by the plaintiff. Id. at 425.
94. Id. See infra note 101.
95. See Furnish, supra note 83, at 423.
96. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
97. The statute required all law enforcement officials to be not less than five feet two
inches tall nor more than six feet ten inches in height, and weigh not less than 120 pounds
nor more than 300 pounds. ALA. CODE § 36-21-46 (1975 & Supp. 1982).
98. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to use general United States population figures to
show the statute's disparate impact on females. The Court rejected the defendant's asser-
tion that population figures for the State of Alabama should be used, because such data
from the smaller sample would not differ. 433 U.S. at 330-31.
99. Id. at 323 n.2. The district court in Dothard found that the statute's height re-
quirement would exclude 33.29% of the women in the United States between the ages of 18
and 79, while only excluding 1.28% of the men. Similarly, the weight restriction would ex-
clude 22.29%of the women and only 2.35% of the men. Combined, the height and weight
standards of the statute excluded 41.13% of the female population while comparatively ex-
cluding less than one percent of the male population. 433 U.S. at 329-30; see Note, Business
Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. Rzv. 376
(1981).
100. 433 U.S. at 332.
101. Id. at 336-37. The job related defense centered around the "contact" oriented
nature of the correction counselor position, in which the inclusion of females would jeopard-
ize prison security. Id.
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Dothard, as an extension of Albemarle, eased the employer's bur-
den of proof promulgated as the Griggs business necessity test. Af-
ter the Dothard decision, a discriminatory employment practice
need only be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job per-
formance to survive a Title VII challenge. 02
The next term in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,0 3 a dis-
parate treatment case, the employer's defense to a Title VII claim
was further broadened.'" Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, 0 5 held that the employer need only show that his hiring proce-
dures were reasonably related to the achievement of some legiti-
mate purpose.'0 6 Justice Rehnquist stated that Title VII does not
impose on employers a duty to adopt hiring procedures that maxi-
mize the hiring of minority employees.10 7 Furnco also considered
the use of statistical evidence in establishing the prima facie case
of employment discrimination and found that evidence of a bal-
anced workforce does not negate finding an employer liable for
specific acts of discrimination. 08 Furnco therefore continued the
Supreme Court's trend of easing the employer's burden of proof in
disparate impact cases, a stand consistent with the Court's position
in Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard in that the question of intent to
discriminate was not recognized as an element of the prima facie
disparate impact violation of Title VII.'0
102. Id. at 331 n.14 (emphasis added).
103. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
104. Id. In Furnco, three black bricklayers brought an action against the company,
charging that their policy of allowing the job superintendent to hire only those applicants
known by him to be experienced or competent was a violation of Title VII. Id. at 569-70.
The Seventh Circuit in Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977) re-
versed the district court, recognizing the claim as one of disparate treatment under McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra note 93. The Seventh Circuit
negated Furnco's business necessity defense by formulating less discriminatory alternative
practices. 551 F.2d at 1088-89.
105. 438 U.S. at 575. The Court used the disparate impact test of McDonnell Douglas,
under which to assert a prima facie claim the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802.
106. 438 U.S. at 576-77.
107. Id. at 577-78.
108. Id. at 579. The use of statistical evidence was discussed in International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) ("[Sjtatistical analyses have served
and will continue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimina-
tion is a disputed issue").
109. Although Furnco was a disparate treatment case, it warrants attention because it
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In 1979, the Supreme Court in an apparent contradiction to its
prior development of disparate impact cases decided New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer. 10 At issue in Beazer was the
validity of the New York City Transit Authority's (T.A.) anti-nar-
cotics rule, 1 ' which excluded methadone1 2 users from employ-
ment in any position with the T.A.115 The plaintiffs" 4 alleged that
the blanket exclusion of all methadone users from any employment
with the T.A. violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'
The district court, without considering the Title VII claim, found
that the T.A.'s criteria had no rational relation to the jobs to be
performed and constituted a violation of both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.11 In a sub-
sequent opinion, the district court additionally found the rule to
violate Title VII.117 Judge Griesa noted that although the T.A.'s
policy was facially neutral, the impact would disproportionally af-
fect more blacks and Hispanics than whites.1 18 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district court on the constitutional issue without considering
the Title VII claim."19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari12 0 and
exemplifies the narrowing burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases and their effect on
disparate impact cases. See generally Furnish, supra note 83, at 435-36.
110. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
111. Id. at 571-72. The anti-narcotics rule is based on Rule 11(b) of T.A.'s Rules and
Regulations: "Employees must not use, or have in their possession, narcotics, tranquilizers,
drugs of the Amphetamine group or barbituate derivitives or paraphernalia used to adminis-
ter narcotics or barbituate derivatives, except with the written permission of the Medical
Director-Chief Surgeon of the System."
112. 440 U.S. at 572-73. Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within Rule 11(b). No
written permission has ever been given by the medical director to employ persons under its
use.
113. 440 U.S. at 571-72.
114. The plaintiffs included four former employee's of the T.A. who additionally rep-
resented the class of all persons who have been or will be subject to dismissal or disqualifi-
cation from employment consideration by the T.A. because of past or present participation
in a methadone program. Beazer v. New York Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1033-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1982). In addition, it was alleged
that the anti-narcotic rule, in conjunction with the T.A. blanket policy, violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976). See 440 U.S. at 576-77.
116. Beazer v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. Bearer v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). It was ad-
mitted that the plaintiffs renewed their claim under Title VII solely to obtain the award of
reasonable attorney's fees for the prevailing party as awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976). 414 F. Supp. at 278.
118. 414 F. Supp. at 279.
119. Beazer v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977). Judge Oakes of the
Second Circuit recognized the award of attorney's fees by the district court in the subse-
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reversed, 2' holding that even if the respondents' weak statistical
evidence established a prima facie case of discrimination, it was
rebutted by the T.A.'s showing that its anti-narcotics rule was job
related. 2 ' Justice Stevens recognized the district court's express
finding that the anti-narcotics rule, unmotivated by racial animus,
eliminated respondent's rebuttal that the policy was merely a pre-
text for intentional discrimination. 23 Through this position, the
Beazer Court established discriminatory intent as an element of
the plaintiffs' rebuttal burden of proof in disparate impact cases;
which in the past had been the major difference between disparate
impact and disparate treatment cases.'
2'
In effect, Beazer is inconsistent with the principles developed by
the Court in Griggs and its progeny. By requiring a showing of in-
tent to discriminate, the Beazer decision virtually eliminated the
plaintiffs' rebuttal to the job related defense of the employer 12 5 as
it was formulated by the Court in Albemarle and Dothard. The
Beazer interpretation reduces the business necessity-job-related-
ness defense to such an extent that it allows employers to exclude
all persons with a particular characteristic, from all jobs because
most persons with the characteristic cannot perform some jobs.12,
In contrast, Griggs mandates that Title VII does not preclude the
use of testing or statistical procedures, but would not give them
controlling force. Since Beazer, the Court has not explained the
divergence it apparently took when the decision was handed down.
The future of the Court's decisions in this area may shed some
light on whether Beazer will or will not be the trend.
quent proceeding, but implied that the reasonable attorney's fees could now be granted the
prevailing party in a § 1983 action under the newly enacted Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
120. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). In addition to the magnitude of the questions involved, the
Court granted certiorari because of the concern over the departure by the lower courts from
the normal procedure of considering, in the same opinion, the statutory claim before the
constitutional claim. Id. at 570-71.
121. Beazer v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1979).
122. Id. at 586-87.
123. Id. at 587.
124. See Furnish, supra note 83, at 424. See also Note, supra note 99, at 418.
125. 440 U.S. at 587. See also Furnish, supra note 83, at 424.
126. See Furnish, supra note 83, at 431. The district court found that not all were
safety sensitive, that some were non-critical on the overall operation of the transportation
system. 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Yet the Court equated the 25% safety
sensitive jobs as justification for refusing employment to all methadone users for all other
positions with the T.A. within the safe and efficient business necessity-job-related defense.
440 U.S. at 587 n.31.
127. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971).
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It can be seen from the foregoing, that although the theoretical
distinctions between the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories appears clear from a definitional standpoint, their case by
case application by the courts has resulted in a blurring and cross
application of the two theories. It has been suggested that this pat-
tern is representative of the Court's evolution toward a merger of
the two theories. 28 This observation appears sound when one
views the overall purpose of Title VII as, to "achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." 29 It does not seem necessary under a Title VII
claim to look to the absence or presence of an intent to discrimi-
nate. Rather, the hiring or promotional criteria employed should
simply be examined on the basis of its impact on the individual
group, its job-relatedness, and its relation to either the business
necessity of employing that particular criterion or the hardship or
unreliability of utilizing any other method.
When examined in this light, the majority in Teal reached the
proper conclusion. The "bottom line" result should not be a valid
defense to a Title VII claim if this "bottom line" was reached pur-
suant to a process which employed a step that had a discrimina-
tory impact on a minority group. To conclude that a bottom line
result favorable to a minority group justifies a discriminatory prac-
tice during the derivation of this favorable end result is untenable
under a Title VII analysis.
The facts of the Teal case itself indicate the patently unreliable
and dangerous nature of the "bottom line" result. For, in Teal, the
promotion list was released one year after the action was insti-
tuted, approximately one month before trial. " Although the Court
failed to raise this point in more than a factual context;' and did
not question the integrity of the Connecticut Department of In-
come Maintenance in the making of this final promotion determi-
nation, surely Teal illustrates the highly suspect nature and poten-
tial for abuse in allowing the "bottom line" as a defense. To hold
otherwise would be virtually to grant employers the right to dis-
criminate against individual minority employees at an early stage
of the employment process, while supplying them with a defense
via a test which would only look to the end result in determining
128. See Furnish, supra note 83, at 419-20.
129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
130. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2529.
131. Id.
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whether a violation had occurred.
The majority in Teal properly reviewed the promotion examina-
tion in light of its impact and job-relatedness. Finding it to have
both a discriminatory impact and a non-job-related status, they
correctly applied the principles of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII
and found that, in fact, a prima facie employment discrimination
violation had occurred, to which the "bottom line" result was no
defense.
Nicholas Galli
